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The Effect of Anti-Avoidance Provisions 
Regarding the Promotion of Innovation: 
Considerations from a Tax Policy Perspective
This article explores the options used to counter 
tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, 
emphasizing the effect on fiscal measures 
designed to encourage innovation. Specifically, 
the author considers the different measures that 
are intended to ensure a fair balance between 
the protection of tax bases and the promotion of 
innovation. 
1.  Introduction
1.1.  Research questions posed
The OECD considers research and development, and 
innovation (R&D (&I)), to be key to productivity and 
growth.1 The Europe 2020 strategy also places R&D (&I) 
at its core with the objective of realizing an overall R&D 
(&I) spending of 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
respect of the European Union.2
It is generally understood that market incentives alone are 
insufficient to produce an adequate supply of R&D (&I) 
and, if there is not an opportunity for profit, R&D (&I) is 
not undertaken. As a result, state intervention is essential 
to stimulate private R&D (&I) spending, by way of sub-
sidies, taxes, trade or other policies, and to influence the 
generation of research and knowledge for sustainable eco-
nomic growth.3
Governments are in charge of defining the tax system, but 
they can also introduce special measures to encourage 
entities to undertake particular business activities within 
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1. OECD, Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innova-
tion (OECD 2013).
2. Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM 
(2010) 2020 (Mar. 2010).
3. In the same vein, according to R.J. Danon, General Report, in Tax Incent-
ives on Research and Development (R&D), International Fiscal association 
(IFA) Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International vol. 100a, sec. 1. (Sdu Uitgevers 
2015), Online Books IBFD: “[s]tate intervention to stimulate R&D is jus-
tified because there is broad agreement that without such intervention 
undertakings will tend to underinvest in R&D compared to the appro-
priate level of spillovers that R&D may generate for society”. See also Å. 
Hansson & C. Brokelind, Tax Incentives, Tax Expenditures Theories in 
R&D: The Case of Sweden, 6 World Tax J. 2, sec. 3. (2014), Journals IBFD.
their territories, i.e. extra fiscal objectives. Consequently, 
taxation can have a regulatory objective by incentivizing 
certain activities, i.e. tax incentives to foster R&D (&I), 
such as intellectual property (IP) boxes and penalizing 
others, i.e. levying a tax on the use of fuel oil to reduce 
the CO2 emissions. In this way, governments can influ-
ence an individual’ s behaviour to realize given valuable 
objectives.4
The implementation of tax incentives to encourage R&D 
(&I) is based on a tax policy decision. In terms of tax com-
petition, countries may introduce special fiscal measures 
under a defensive or aggressive approach. On the one 
hand, technology-exporting countries normally imple-
ment measures that are intended to retaining intangibles 
and the related IP rights. As a result, the objective is to 
counter the location of highly mobile capital in low-tax 
jurisdictions. On the other hand, technology-importing, 
or developing, countries adopt an aggressive position with 
the purpose of attracting intangibles and the related IP 
rights. In other words, the objective is to encourage com-
panies to undertake certain economic activities within 
their territories. Consequently, there could be a risk of 
R&D (&I) delocalization, as a measure would not operate 
where an asset had been developed or directly exploited.
As is commonly known, intangibles are highly mobile as 
well as being drivers of value.5 The nature of such activi-
ties makes it very easy to transfer them from one country 
to another. Globalization and technological innovation 
have further enhanced that mobility.6 Consequently, the 
scope of R&D (&I) may imply a risk of profit shifting. 
Base erosion and profit shifting, which is primarily un-
dertaken by multinational groups in relation to tax juris-
dictions with low or non-taxation, is not only a problem 
of great global significance that undermines the principle 
of tax fairness, but also constitutes unfair business compe-
tition with other taxpayers that, because of their national 
dimension, cannot adopt such practices. Indeed, harmful 
tax practices may result in the transfer of part of the tax 
burden to less mobile tax bases, i.e. labour, property and 
consumption, to counter the revenue loss or to improve 
4. D. Hancock, An Introduction to Taxation: Policy and Practice 2nd edn., 
p. 7 (Chapman & Hall 1995).
5. According to OECD, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules 
– Action 3: 2015 Final Report pp. 44-45 (OECD 2015), International Orga-
nizations’ Documentation IBFD, royalties and IP income, among other 
categories of income, are likely to be geographically mobile and are, there-
fore, likely to raise issues regarding base erosion and profit shifting.
6. OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into 
Account Transparency and Substance – Action 5: 2015 Final Report p. 11 
(OECD 2015), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
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tax collection. In addition, these changes in the structure 
of taxation could make a tax system less efficient in terms 
of its effect on growth and employment in the long run.7
Since 2013, the OECD has been promoting its Action Plan 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)8 in an attempt 
to counter global harmful tax practices that permit multi-
national groups to undertake aggressive tax planning. The 
latest Communication of the European Commission of 
June 2015 also commenced its own initiative to deal with 
base erosion and profit shifting practices. This EU initia-
tive proposes the relaunch of the common consolidated 
corporate tax base (CCCTB), which would include spe-
cific rules to counter base erosion and profit shifting prac-
tices, i.e. preferential regimes rules, limitation on interest 
deductions, controlled foreign company (CFC) and trans-
fer pricing rules, among others.
There is no doubt of the high economic and technolog-
ical value of innovative activities. However, at the same 
time, such activities can result in base erosion and profit 
shifting. Anti-avoidance provisions may help to counter 
harmful tax practices, but it is important to emphasize 
the (negative) effect that anti-abuse provisions can have 
on encouraging innovation, such as neutralizing their 
effects. Indeed, even if EU and OECD initiatives cannot 
be regarded as anti-incentives projects, they have an in-
direct effect on the design and implementation of R&D 
(&I) tax measures.
1.2.  Outline of the article
Bearing in mind what is stated in section 1.1., the objec-
tive of this article is to explore the different possibilities 
that are used to counter tax avoidance and aggressive tax 
planning, and noting their effect on fiscal measures that 
are designed to encourage technological innovation. The 
article is therefore organized into the following sections. 
Section 2. examines some general features of anti-abuse 
provisions and introduces section 3., which deals with 
the compatibility of patent box regimes and CFC rules. 
Section 4. focuses on R&D (&I) costs in the proposed new 
CCCTB at an EU level, in particular, considering qual-
ifying R&D (&I) expenses in selected jurisdictions. The 
article concludes with section 5. and provides answers to 
the research questions posed in section 1.1.
7. A contrario sensu, the European Commission considers that, given that 
some categories of taxes are known to be less detrimental to growth than 
others, i.e. labour taxes, a move towards growth-friendly taxes could 
generate static and dynamic efficiency gains. Consequently, transferring 
tax away from labour, especially for the most vulnerable groups, could 
stimulate the supply of labour by reducing the disincentives to work and 
could raise the demand for labour by reducing labour costs of entities. 
On the other hand, transferring taxation from income to consumption 
reduces the tax burden on savings, as savings are defined as disposable 
income minus consumption. See European Commission, Tax Reforms in 
EU Member States, Working Paper No. 38 pp. 48-49 (2013), EU Law IBFD.
8. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013), In-
ternational Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
2.  R&D (&I) Tax Schemes and Anti-Avoidance 
Provisions
2.1.  In general
Interest in increasing business spending on R&D (&I) is 
based on its consideration as key factor with regard to pro-
ductivity and growth9 as well as the fact that such spending 
can contribute to social welfare and technological prog-
ress.10 Indeed, technology and innovation are important 
drivers of economic development, inter alia, resulting in 
new products and higher income.11 This may justify a 
policy of subsidizing scientific and entrepreneurial activ-
ities that could result in innovation and, therefore, to the 
accumulation of valuable intangible assets, such as know-
how, patents, trademarks and copyrights.12
It is widely understood that tax incentives may result in the 
provision of new goods and services, thereby increasing 
productivity and higher incomes. As the benefits of R&D 
(&I) investment is usually greater for the general public 
than for the investor, enterprises often invest in R&D (&I) 
to a lesser extent than society would desire. Consequently, 
tax incentives can make innovation more economically 
viable.13 Nevertheless, fiscal incentives can be abused and 
may be incompatible with EU and international stan-
dards. For instance, tax incentives are prima facie a selec-
tive measure, so they can fall within the scope of State aids 
in article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU).14
As noted in section 1.1., R&D (&I) schemes and IP regimes 
may give rise to a risk of base erosion and profit shifting. 
Base erosion and profit shifting is mainly undertaken by 
multinational groups in relation to tax jurisdictions with 
low or non-taxation. That is, for example, jurisdictions 
granting special tax regimes, such as the patent box, or 
jurisdictions with a low level of taxation, i.e. tax havens.
In Figure 1, the IP Holding Co. and the Operating Co. 
are residents in different Member States and are associ-
ated entities within the multinational group directed by 
the Parent Co., resident in a third state. Consequently, if 
Member State A has an IP box regime, royalties are taxed at 
a low rate. As the Interest and Royalties Directive (2003/49) 
9. OECD, Tax Incentives for Research and Development: Trends and Issues p. 
2 (OECD 2002); OECD, supra n. 1, at 17; and European Commission, 
A Study on R&D Tax Incentives: Final Report, Taxation Papers, Working 
Paper No. 52, p. 38 (2014), EU Law IBFD.
10. M.B. Corchuelo Martínez-Azúa, Incentivos fiscales a la I+D en la OCDE: 
estudio comparative, Cuadernos Económicos de ICE, Ministerio de 
Economía y Competitividad 73, p. 197 (2007).
11. A.M. Bal & R.H.M.J. Offermanns, R&D Tax Incentives in Europe, 52 Eur. 
Taxn. 4 (2012), Journals IBFD.
12. P. Arginelli, Innovation through R&D Tax Incentives: Some Ideas for a Fair 
and Transparent Tax Policy, 7 World Tax J. 1 (2015), Journals IBFD.
13. A.M. Bal, Competition for Research & Development Tax Incentives in the 
European Union – How an Optimal Research & Development System Should 
Be Designed, 66 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 10 (2012), Journals IBFD.
14. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ C115 (2008), EU 
Law IBFD. For further information on R&D (&I) and State aid, see R.H.C. 
Luja, EU Report, in IFA, supra n. 3; A. Nykieal-Mateo, State Aid Limitations 
on Fiscal Support to R&D&I, in Tax Aspects of Research and Development 
within the European Union (W. Nykiel & A. Zalasinski eds., Wolters Kluwer 
Bus. 2014); and B. Pérez Bernabeu, R&D&I Tax Incentives in the European 
Union and State Aid Rules, 54 Eur. Taxn. 5 (2014), Journals IBFD.
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applies, no withholding tax is levied.15 Finally, if the third 
state does not have CFC rules, any foreign income cannot 
be attributed to the shareholders in the parent jurisdiction.
In general, governments have various options with which 
to counter tax avoidance through the abuse of legal forms. 
These include general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs), spe-
cific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs), and transfer pricing16 
and CFC rules.
2.2.  GAARs and SAARs to counter the risk of IP profit 
shifting
2.2.1.  GAARs
GAARs provide an instrument for the tax administra-
tions to reclassify a given arrangement by interpreting 
the tax legislation according to its purpose.17 In Spain, for 
15. Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a Common System of 
Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made between As-
sociated Companies of Different Member States, OJ L 49 (2007), EU Law 
IBFD [hereinafter: the Interest and Royalties Directive (2003/49)]. The 
Interest and Royalties Directive (2003/49) is designed to eliminate with-
holding tax obstacles in respect of cross-border interest and royalty pay-
ments within a group of companies by abolishing withholding taxes on 
royalty and interest payments arising in a Member State. According to the 
EU Action Plan, the Interest and Royalties Directive (2003/49) should be 
amended so that Member States are not required to give beneficial treat-
ment to interest and royalty payments if there is no effective taxation else-
where in the European Union. (See European Commission, A Fair and 
Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for 
Action, COM (2015) 302 final p. 17 (17 June 2015), EU Law IBFD.) As a 
result, the Working Party on Tax Questions – Direct Taxation of 16 Feb. 
2016 considered that the minimum ETR should be 10%. That is, any inter-
est and royalty payment would be exempted from taxes in the Member 
State where they arise when the ETR resulting from the tax regime apply-
ing to those payments in the Member State of the beneficial owner is at 
least 10%.
16. Briefly, transfer pricing rules are intended to adjust the taxable profits of 
associated enterprises to eliminate distortions arising whenever the prices 
or other conditions of transactions between such enterprises differ from 
what they would have been if the enterprises had been unrelated. The 
OECD, supra n. 8, Actions 8-10 (Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes 
with Value Creation) and Action 13 (Transfer Pricing Documentation and 
Country-by-Country (CbC) Reporting) address transfer pricing issues.
17. V. Ruiz Almendral, Tax Avoidance and the European Court of Justice: What 
is at Stake for European General Anti-Avoidance Rules?, 33 Intertax 12, 
p. 565 (2005).
example, the Spanish Ley General Tributaria (General Tax 
Law, LGT)18 contains a number of rules that are intended 
to counter tax avoidance. These instruments are to be 
found in article 15, i.e. the “fraus legis” or substance-over-
form rule, article 16, i.e. the anti-sham rule, and article 13, 
i.e. the “taxation of the real transaction” rule, of the LGT.
With regard to R&D (&I), a GAAR may disallow the 
deductibility of payments, such as royalties, to tax havens 
under certain conditions. It is, however, difficult to draw 
the line between wholly artificial structures and genuine 
activities. As a result, it may be easy for entities to cir-
cumvent the application of a GAAR. The effectiveness 
of GAAR depends greatly on the interpretation adopted 
by national courts,19 which results in considerable uncer-
tainty in the application of tax law. Finally, it is important 
to note that tax planning, even if considered aggressive, is 
not necessarily illegal.20
Action 6 of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative identifies 
treaty abuse, in particular, treaty shopping, as one of 
the most important sources of concerns regarding base 
erosion and profit shifting.21 The Report gives most atten-
tion to this objective, in proposing a limitation-on-bene-
fits (LOB) clause and a principle purposes test (PPT) rule, 
but it also recommends the introduction of a GAAR into 
tax treaties.22
18. ES: Ley General Tributaria (General Tax Law, LGT).
19. In Spain, the limitation of the tax avoidance can be found in several 
judgements of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, TS), such as in ES: 
STS 3267/2012, 19 Apr. 2012; ES: STS 1060/2014, 17 Mar. 2014; ES: STS 
2540/2014, 19 June 2014; and ES: STS 2796/2015, 18 June 2015, among 
others.
20. C. Spengel,et al., Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by Multina-
tional Firms: Issues and Options for Reform, Discussion Paper No. 13-044, 
ZEW, Centre for European Economic Research, 2013, available at http://
ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13044.pdf.
21. OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circum-
stances – Action 6: 2015 Final Report (OECD 2015), International Orga-
nizations’ Documentation IBFD.
22. C. Palao Taboada, OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action 6: The 
General Anti-Abuse Rule, 69 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 10 (2015), Journals IBFD.
Figure 1: The multinational group scenario
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Additionally, in defining “special tax regime”, Action 6 pro-
poses new provisions regarding article 11 (Interest), article 
12 (Royalties) and article 13 (Other income) of the OECD 
Model.23 In accordance with the new provision that has 
been proposed with regard to article 12 (Royalties) of the 
OECD Model:
[r]oyalties arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned 
by a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in the 
first-mentioned Contracting State in accordance with domestic 
law if such resident is subject to a special tax regime...24
The new provision would permit the taxation in the source 
state where there is a preferential tax regime in the resi-
dence state and this is defined in the relevant tax treaty. 
Consequently, in Figure 1 (see section 2.1.), Member 
State B, i.e. the source state, could tax the royalties if the 
IP Holding Co., i.e. the beneficial owner, was subject to a 
special tax regime as defined in the relevant tax treaty. In 
this context, it should, however, be noted that, within the 
EU framework, i.e. the scenario in Figure 1, the Interest 
and Royalties Directive (2003/49) would apply.
In accordance with this proposal, a “special tax regime” 
would mean:
any legislation, regulation or administrative practice that pro-
vides a preferential effective rate of taxation to such income or 
profit, including through reductions in the tax rate or the tax 
base... However, the term shall not include any legislation, regu-
lation or administrative practice [whose application] does not 
disproportionately benefit interest, royalties or other income, or 
any combination thereof.25
The definition excludes from the term “special tax regime” 
a provision if the application of such a provision implies a 
proportional benefit.
This term also excludes any provision “that satisfies a sub-
stantial activity requirement”.26 Such an exception is prob-
ably intended to take into account those IP box regimes 
that, following Action 5 of the OECD/G20 BEPS initia-
tive, have adopted a nexus approach. Similarly, the new 
US Model (2016) denies reductions to withholding taxes 
under a tax treaty in respect of deductible related-party 
payments where the beneficial owner of the payment pays 
little or no tax on the related income as a result of a “special 
tax regime”.27
Given the “proportional benefit” as an exception, this 
raises the question how to interpret this expression. If the 
justification for introducing a special tax regime is the 
existence of constitutional values or another public inter-
est, i.e. extra fiscal objectives:
tax benefits should be in accordance with the proportionality 
principle and, in any case, cannot be based on arbitrary deci-
sions.28
23. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (26 July 2014), 
Models IBFD.
24. OECD, supra n. 21, at 96-98.
25. Id., at 96-97.
26. Id., at 97.
27. US Model Tax Convention on Income (17 Feb. 2016), Models IBFD.
28. M.A. Gutiérrez Bengoechea, Algunas notas sobre la extrafiscalidad y su 
desarrollo en el derecho tributario, Revista Técnica Tributaria 107, p. 153 
(2014).
In this way, the requirements of a valid different tax treat-
ment in comparable situations are (1) an objective and 
reasonable justification, i.e. constitutional values; (2) the 
proportionality of the measure; and (3) tax incentives that 
are checked accordingly, depending on comparability and 
the type of incentive. With regard to the proportionality 
requirement, a special provision in respect of R&D (&I) is 
considered to be proportional only if the same result could 
not have been arrived at a less distortive measure. In par-
ticular, the amount and intensity of the measure must be 
limited to the minimum needed for such R&D (&I) activ-
ities.29 Consequently, such a special provision would be 
proportional, and reasonable, if it retained a fair balance 
between the effectiveness in realizing the objective, i.e. 
encouraging R&D (&I) activities, and its effect on public 
resources.
2.2.2.  SAARs
Countries may also introduce SAARs to counter the risk of 
profit shifting in relation to certain items. In this respect, 
there is, in general, an increasing use of SAARs or special 
measures to address concerns regarding base erosion and 
profit shifting derived from IP income.30 For instance, in 
France, article 11 of the Loi de Finances pour 2012 (Finance 
Act for 2012)31 restricts the conditions for deducting 
licensing royalties where the licensor and the licensee are 
related entities. A full deduction for the royalty expense 
is only allowed if the licensee can demonstrate, and can 
properly document, that: (1) the use of the licence results 
in added value for the licensee over the entire licensing 
period; and (2) the use is real, i.e. does not involve the use 
of an artificial scheme.32
In Austria, for example, from March 2014, royalties paid 
by an Austrian firm to a foreign recipient are not deduct-
ible when the royalties are exempt or subject to an effective 
tax rate (ETR) of less than 10% in the hands of the recipi-
ent.33 It would appear that the new rules are designed to 
target patent box regimes.34 In this regard, the proposal 
29. European Commission, Community Framework for State Aid for 
Research and Development and Innovation (2006/C 323/01) (30 Dec. 
2006). In this vein, in Spain, ES: TS, 30 Sept. 1999, Decision No. 718 stated 
that an excessive tax reduction affects the principle of ability to pay set 
out in art. 31(1) of the Constitution, in being an unreasonable and inap-
propriate measure for realizing the purpose of promoting an economic 
activity, i.e. R&D (&I). According to the TS, such a measure could nega-
tively affect the free movement of people, goods and services.
30. According to J. Freedman, Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of 
a General Anti-Avoidance Principle, Brit. Tax Rev. 4, p. 352 (2004) the in-
creased use of specific anti-avoidance legislation may give rise to more liti-
gation and greater uncertainty and, therefore, “what we need is not more 
precise and detailed provisions but a principles or standards approach”).
31. FR: Loi 2011-1977 du 28 décembre 2011 de finances pour 2012 (Law 
2011-1977 of 28 December 2011), available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000025044460&categorieLien=id 
(accessed 28 Feb. 2016).
32. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Worldwide Tax Summaries: Corporate 
Taxes 2015/16, p. 675, available at www.pwc.com/taxsummaries (accessed 
28 Feb. 2016).
33. K. Mitterlehner & M. Mitterlehner, Austria, in IFA, supra n. 3, at sec. 2.4.3. 
and Y. Schuchter & A. Kras, Austria – Corporate Taxation sec. 1., Country 
Surveys IBFD (accessed 30 June 2015).
34. Danon, supra n. 3, at sec. 4.3.4.3. It is important to note that, for the time 
being, Austria has not implemented a patent box regime, but that indirect 
effects may arise in its territory from such measures. In this respect, see J. 
Loeprick, Indirect Access to Intellectual Property Regimes – Effects on Aus-
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to amend the Interest and Royalties Directive to include 
a minimum effective taxation (MET) clause should be 
noted. Consequently, any interest and royalty payments 
would be exempt from tax in the source state when the 
ETR resulting from the tax regime for such payments in the 
residence state is at least 10%.35 The proposed amendment 
is, in fact, a SAAR, which strengthens the effective taxa-
tion of interest and royalty payments in the residence state. 
The current work on the MET clause takes into consider-
ation the nexus-compliant IP regimes as Member States 
may retain the possibility to provide entities with effective 
tax incentives to invest in genuine R&D (&I) in the Euro-
pean Union. As a result, a balance between the promotion 
of R&D (&I) and a minimum level of effective taxation 
should be maintained.
On the other hand, the Belgian patent income deduction 
does not apply to income derived from R&D (&I) that is 
performed under a development contract or cost-shar-
ing agreement. According to the first paragraph of article 
205(3) of the Belgian Code des impôts sur le revenu 1992/
Wet op de inkomstenbelasting 1992 (Income Tax Code 1992, 
CIR/WIB),36 income from IP that has been acquired must 
be reduced by the compensation paid to third parties in 
obtaining the IP and the amortization applied to the acqui-
sition value of the patents. Consequently, such an anti-
abuse provision applies to patents acquired to avoid, first, 
a double deduction in respect of the costs and, second, a 
double dip due to the use of successive licences and sub-
licences.37
This Belgian example leads to the following question: 
should IP box regimes apply to IP that has been acquired? 
The broad or narrow scope of the eligible IP rights is 
based on a tax policy decision. On the one hand, patent 
boxes can require that any qualifying IP must have been 
self-developed. As a result, this encourages the creation, 
exploitation and commercialization of new intangibles. 
On the other hand, IP box regimes can also permit IP 
that has been acquired to benefit from the regime. Con-
sequently, income but not the associated genuine activi-
ties are encouraged, which brings with it a potential risk 
of profit shifting. In these last examples, a condition of 
further development should be required.
This is not possible in countries that do not allow acquired 
IP to benefit from preferential treatment, i.e. in the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom (under 
certain conditions), among others. On the other hand, 
other countries have extended the scope of their regimes to 
include acquired IP assets, i.e. in Cyprus, France, Hungary, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Malta, subject to certain 
restrictions, i.e. in France and Luxembourg.38
trian and German Affiliates, WU Intl. Taxn. Research Paper Series No. 
13 (2015).
35. See supra n. 15.
36. BE: Code des impôts sur le revenu 1992/Wet op de inkomstenbelasting 
1992 (Income Tax Code 1992, CIR/WIB).
37. M. de Mil & T. Wallyn, Belgium, in IFA, supra n. 3, at “Summary and con-
clusions” and sec. 1.5.7.
38. Danon, supra n. 3, at sec. 4.2.2.2.
2.3.  The “modified nexus approach” as a SAAR
For some years now, income from certain types of R&D 
(&I) intangibles have been able to benefit from special tax 
measures that may take the form of tax allowances, exemp-
tions and lower ETRs, among others. The asserted objec-
tive pursued by the governments that have introduced IP 
boxes is to make innovation more attractive and profitable 
for entities.39 In this context, it should be noted that patent 
boxes are officially aimed at encouraging the creation 
and development of new R&D (&I) intangibles and/or at 
enhancing the direct use of intangibles in the undertak-
ing of a business, with a view to increase the positive “spill-
overs” of such creation and exploitation and, therefore, the 
social welfare. Generally, IP boxes provide an incentive on 
the basis of reduced tax for economic operators to develop 
new innovative products and processes or to perform ser-
vices.40 The objective of a patent box regime is to provide 
an additional incentive for companies to retain and com-
mercialize existing patents and to develop new innovative 
patented products.41 However, these regimes can also be 
unfair and discriminatory and can promote tax avoidance. 
A patent box regime may be considered to be aggressive 
tax planning, as it may offer a low tax rate on certain IP 
income and provide an incentive for multinational groups 
to establish patent-box structures to obtain the tax advan-
tages offered by the regime.42
The EU Code of Conduct in business taxation concerns 
those measures which affect, or may affect, in a significant 
way the location of business activity within the European 
Union.43 According to the Code of Conduct, in assessing 
if such measures are harmful:
account should be taken of, inter alia:... whether advantages are 
granted even without any real economic activity and substantial 
economic presence within the Member State offering such tax 
advantages, or...
This means that qualifying IP rights should be created, 
developed and exploited in the territory of the Member 
State introducing the patent box regime. Due to the global-
ization and the Single Market, it would appear to be quite 
complicated that an intangible asset has been created in 
only one Member State. For instance, in the former (and 
39. Currently, patent box regimes are basically a European tax incentive. In 
total, the following 12 Member States have an IP box regime: Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Further, in 2011, 
Liechtenstein and the Swiss canton of Nidwalden introduced patent box 
regimes. Switzerland is undertaking a tax reform with a strong package of 
measures to encourage R&D (&I) activities, including an IP box proposal 
based on the nexus approach. Finally, in Sep. 2015, the United States pub-
lished a discussion draft with a view to implement a patent box regime.
40. M. Felder, IP Boxes from a European, Liechtenstein and Swiss Perspective 
p. 1 (Schulthess Verlag 2013).
41. Pérez Bernabeu, supra n. 14, at sec. 2.
42. European Commission, Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and 
Indicators (Final Report), Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 61 p. 51 
(2015).
43. Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 con-
cerning taxation policy – Resolution of the Council and Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council 
of 1 December 1997 on a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, OJ 
C 002, 06/01/1998, pp. 0001-0006, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998Y0106(01):en:HTML.
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inconsistent) Spanish IP box regime,44 it was necessary that 
the transferor had created the assets or IP rights repres-
enting at least 25% of its cost.45 This means that the trans-
feror could have concluded a cost-sharing agreement with 
other entities located in different Member States to create 
and develop IP rights. Following the Code of Conduct, a 
patent box regime that benefits such a situation could fall 
within the scope of harmful tax competition, as there is no 
full self-generating R&D (&I) process.
Nevertheless, the aspect noted by the EU Code of Conduct 
could imply a contradiction with other EU principles. In 
fact, the limitation of an economic activity to a particular 
territory could be run counter to the fundamental free-
doms of the European Union. This apparent contradiction 
between the EU principles and the Code of Conduct may 
make controlling harmful tax practices a difficult task.
Along these lines, the OECD regards preferential tax 
regimes as a key pressure area. In order for a regime to 
be considered preferential, the regime must, first, apply 
to income from geographically mobile activities, i.e. divi-
dends, royalties and IP income. Second, it must offer some 
form of tax preference, i.e. a tax credit, a tax allowance or a 
lower tax rate, compared to the general principles of taxa-
tion in the relevant Member State, i.e. reflect the princi-
ples of ability to pay or equality.46 The introduction of tax 
incentives implies to move from the general prohibition 
in respect of the granting fiscal privileges legitimated by 
tax justice criteria, mainly, the ability to pay and equality, 
to the compatibility with the “extra fiscal goals” as legiti-
mated by constitutional values.
The OECD BEPS Action Plan called for proposals to 
develop solutions to counter harmful tax regimes more 
effectively, taking into account such factors as transpar-
ency and substance in Action 5.47 Indeed, according to the 
Deliverable regarding Action 5 of September 2014,48 this 
issue was examined and a proposal made for the applic-
ation of a “nexus approach” that would align R&D (&I) 
expenditure with the granting of tax benefits. Using such 
approach as a model, Germany and the United Kingdom 
issued a joint statement proposing a modified nexus 
approach (MNA) in November 2014. Under the MNA, 
which is inspired from existing input incentives and pro-
portionate in nature, the benefits provided by patent 
boxes are linked to the qualifying R&D (&I) expenditure 
incurred by the taxpayer itself.49
44. ES: Ley 48/2015, de 29 de octobre, de los Presupuestos Generales del 
Estado para el año 2016 (General State Budget for 2016 (Law 48 of 29 
October 2015), Law 48) has amended the patent box regime so that 
it is in line with the agreements adopted by the European Union and 
the OECD. Law 48 includes a grandfathering clause. Consequently, the 
current scheme can be applied up to June 2021.
45. Following the amendment made by Law 48, this requirement disappears.
46. OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue pp. 19-35 
(OECD 1998) and OECD, supra n. 6, at 19-22.
47. OECD, supra n. 13, at pp. 17-18.
48. OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively Taking into 
Account Transparency and Substance – Action 5: 2014 Deliverable (OECD 
2014), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
49. OECD, supra n. 6, at 25; Danon, supra n. 3, at sec. 4.3.2. and R. Sanz-
Gómez, The OECD’ s Nexus Approach to IP Boxes: A European Union Law 
Perspective, WU Intl. Taxn. Research Paper Series No. 12 (2015).
According to the Final Report on Action 5 of the OECD/
G20 BEPS initiative of October 2015, a consensus has been 
reached regarding the “nexus approach” as the approach to 
be adopted in requiring substantial activity for preferential 
regimes.50 The eligible income in respect of a tax regime is 
calculated by applying the following formula:
(Qualifying expenditure incurred to develop IP asset / Overall 
expenditure incurred to develop IP asset) x Overall income from 
IP asset = Income qualifying for tax benefits
In this formula, qualifying expenditure is defined as 
expenditure directly connected to the IP asset, in par-
ticular, the R&D (&I) expenditure incurred by the tax-
payer and expenditure in respect of unrelated-party out-
sourcing. In contrast, overall expenditure includes both of 
these categories, plus acquisition costs and expenditure in 
respect of related-party outsourcing. As a result, a taxpayer 
may benefit from an IP regime only to the extent that the 
taxpayer has incurred qualifying R&D (&I) expenditure 
in realizing the IP income. However, further aspects on 
the application of the nexus approach are set out in the 
Final Report on Action 5 of the OECD/G20 BEPS initia-
tive, i.e. qualifying taxpayers, IP assets, etc. With regard to 
qualifying expenditure, jurisdictions may permit taxpay-
ers to apply a 30% “up-lift” to expenditure that is included 
in qualifying expenditure with the purpose of benefiting 
taxpayers undertaking R&D (&I) activities themselves, but 
without penalizing taxpayers that acquire IP or outsourc-
ing R&D (&I) activities to related parties. As a result, qual-
ifying expenditure may be increased, provided that qual-
ifying expenditure does not exceed overall expenditure.
Consequently, patent box regimes are now facing a new 
situation. The initiatives launched by the OECD/G20 in 
developing BEPS Action 5 and by the European Union in 
relation to the EU Code of Conduct represent a turning 
point for the existing regimes. A new deadline is on the 
horizon and insofar as the countries affected by this process 
follow the new rules, only those regimes that comply with 
the new standards will survive in the near future.51 Some 
existing regimes have already been amended so as to be in 
line with the “nexus approach”, i.e. in Spain and the United 
Kingdom (see section 3.3.).
Therefore, the “nexus approach” can be regarded as an 
anti-avoidance measure. As is commonly held, SAARs 
usually establish a link between tax avoidance and the lack 
50. A total of 43 preferential regimes were reviewed, out of which 16 are IP 
regimes. With regard to substantial activities, the IP regimes reviewed 
were all considered to be inconsistent, either in whole or in part, with the 
nexus approach as described in the OECD, supra n. 6.
51. Consequently, new entrants are not allowed to join any existing IP regime 
that is inconsistent with the “nexus approach” after 30 June 2016. If a new 
regime that is in line with the “nexus approach” takes full effect before 
30 June 2016, new entrants are not allowed to join in the existing IP 
regime after the compliant IP regime has taken effect. It is considered 
that amendments to bring a regime into line with the “nexus approach” 
must have been instituted in 2015. This was the case, for example, in 
Italy and Spain. Jurisdictions can also introduce grandfathering rules, for 
example in Spain, that will allow all of the taxpayers benefiting from an 
existing regime to keep such entitlement until a second specific date, i.e. 
the “abolition date”. The period between the two dates should not exceed 
five years, i.e. 30 June 2021 at the latest. After that date, no more benefits 
stemming from the respective old regimes may be made available to tax-
payers. In this context, see OECD, supra n. 6, at 34-35.
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of valid economic reasons.52 This means that, a contrario 
sensu, the presence of an economically valid justification 
should avoid the application of the SAAR. With regard 
to IP box regimes, the fulfilment of the “nexus approach” 
requirement implies that there is a substantial and genuine 
economic activity behind the realization of IP income that 
applies to the preferential tax treatment. As a result, only 
income that arises from IP where the actual R&D (&I) 
activities were undertaken by the taxpayer should benefit 
from an IP box regime, thereby excluding its consider-
ations as a harmful preferential tax regime.
3.  Anti-Abuse Provisions, CFCs and Patent Boxes
3.1.  The framework of CFC rules: Strengthening the 
design
CFC legislation is intended to counter tax avoidance 
effected by way of CFCs located in low-tax jurisdic-
tions. As is commonly held, CFCs provide opportuni-
ties for profit shifting and the long-term deferral of taxa-
tion. There is no doubt that a tax credit in respect of R&D 
(&I) or a patent box regime implies a tax advantage, in 
terms that they provide a better tax treatment to a taxpayer 
undertaking such activities.
The OECD BEPS Action Plan emphasizes the need to 
address base erosion and profit shifting by the use of CFC 
rules. In particular, the OECD wishes to see uniform CFC 
rules to counter BEPS in a more comprehensive manner. 
The OECD Action Plan on BEPS refers to the “positive 
‘spill-over’ effects of CFC rules due to the result that tax-
payers would have a much reduced incentive to shift 
profits into a low tax jurisdiction”.53
CFC rules primarily result in the inclusion of income in 
the residence state of the parent company, but they also 
have positive “spill-over” effects in source states, as tax-
payers have no, or much less of an, incentive to transfer 
profits to a third low-tax jurisdiction.54
Action 3 of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative recognizes that 
corporate groups may create low-taxed non-resident affil-
iates to which they transfer income and that these affili-
ates may be established in low-tax jurisdictions wholly or 
partly for tax reasons rather than for non-tax business rea-
sons.55 CFC rules counter such practices, but some coun-
tries do not currently have CFC rules, i.e. see Figure 1 in 
section 2.1., and that others have rules that do not always 
counter base erosion and profit shifting in a comprehen-
sive manner.56
52. According to M.T. Soler Roch, Las normas antiabuso generales y especia-
les, VII Jornada Metodológica de Derecho Financiero y Tributario Jaime 
García Añoveros, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 12, p. 177 et seq. (2011), 
in Spain, most SAARs are based on the absence of valid corporate or eco-
nomic reason other than the tax savings.
53. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013).
54. OECD, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 3: Strengthening CFC rules 
(OECD 2015), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
55. OECD, supra n. 5, at 11.
56. The first CFC rules were enacted in 1962. Currently, 30 of the countries 
participating in the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative have CFC rules and many 
others have expressed interest in implementing such rules. See OECD, 
supra n. 5, at 9.
In order to establish whether CFC rules apply, several 
questions must be considered according to Action 3 of the 
OECD/G20 BEPS initiative. First, a CFC should be treated 
as controlled where residents control, at a minimum, more 
than 50%, either directly or indirectly. Such control could 
refer to legal control, i.e. the voting rights held in a sub-
sidiary, economic control, i.e. the rights to profits as well 
as the capital and the assets of a company in certain cir-
cumstances, de facto control, i.e. who takes the top-level 
decisions regarding the affairs of the foreign company, or 
control based on consolidation, i.e. relating to accounting 
principles. Once a foreign company has been determined 
to be a CFC, the next question is whether the income 
earned by the CFC raises concerns regarding base erosion 
and profit shifting and, therefore, that the relevant income 
should be attributed to the controlling parties.
3.2.  The requirement of substantial economic activity 
in the context of IP regimes
As a matter of fact, not all CFC income should be attrib-
uted under CFC rules. That is, in some cases the estab-
lishing of non-resident affiliates can be based on business 
reasons, i.e. the availability of employees, nature resources, 
etc. Consequently, income that arises from economic and 
value-creating activities should be excluded from the 
scope of CFC rules.
In the same vein, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (ECJ), in Cadbury Schweppes (Case C-196/04),57 
stated that the use of CFC rules is justified when, in order 
to counter tax avoidance, they are specifically targeted 
at wholly artificial arrangements that do not reflect eco-
nomic reality and whose only purpose would be to obtain 
a tax advantage. As a result, especially within an EU frame-
work, a substance analysis is required only to subject tax-
payers to CFC rules if the CFCs are not involved in genuine 
economic activities.
As noted in section 1.1., as intangibles are highly mobile, 
royalties and other IP income can easily be diverted from 
where the value of the intangible was created or developed. 
In this context, see the situation outlined in Figure 2.
In Figure 2, Country C has a high-technology environ-
ment. Accordingly, the Parent Co., located in Country P, 
which has CFC rules, has established an R&D (&I) Centre 
there due to the availability of qualified employees, good 
facilities and resources. It has also established IP Holding 
Co. given the strong protection of IP rights as well as the 
preferential tax treatment in Country C. Company B, 
which is an associated entity resident in Country B, buys 
the intangibles created by the R&D (&I) Centre and held 
by IP Holding Co. for its direct use in its industrial process. 
It also licenses patents to Company A1 and Company A2, 
which are located in Country A.
Royalties and IP income could be used to transfer purely 
passive income, i.e. income that does not arise from 
57. UK: ECJ, 12 Sept. 2006, Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ECJ Case Law 
IBFD.
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any substantial economic activity. However, IP-derived 
income does not always address base erosion and profit 
shifting concerns. For instance, in Figure 2, Parent Co. has 
established non-resident affiliates for business reasons, i.e. 
the innovation environment. Even if the R&D (&I) Centre, 
which is located in Country C, has created the IP asset, 
Parent Co. has been responsible for much of the value 
creation, as it holds 100% of the shares of the R&D (&I) 
Centre. Company B also uses, and probably further devel-
ops, IP that has been acquired for direct use and exploita-
tion. Consequently, behind the income received from the 
direct use and exploitation there is an economic activity, 
i.e. developing new products through the IP that has been 
acquired. However, Company B licenses the patents that 
have been acquired from IP Holding Co. to companies 
located in Country A. In such circumstances, there are no 
real activities, as Company B is only licensing IP that has 
been acquired and obtains royalty income for this non-
value-creating transaction.
As a result, in a similar way to Action 5 of the OECD/G20 
BEPS initiative,58 a substance analysis considers whether 
a CFC is engaged in substantial activities in determining 
what income should be regarded as “CFC income”. Such 
an analysis can apply as either a threshold test or a propor-
tionate analysis.59 First, under a threshold, or “all-or-noth-
ing”, test, a set amount of activity, as identified through one 
or more proxies, would permit all of the income of the 
CFC to be excluded. A CFC that had not engaged in this 
amount of activity would have all of its income included 
in CFC income. Second, under a proportionate analysis, 
only the amount of income that was proportionate to the 
amount of activity that the CFC had undertaken would 
be excluded from CFC income. For instance, if the CFC 
had undertaken 75% of the activity that would have to be 
performed to earn the CFC’ s income, 25% of its income 
would be treated as CFC income.
58. OECD, supra n. 6, at 24 et seq.
59. OECD, supra n. 5, at 47-49.
With regard to the different ways that a jurisdiction may 
design a substance analysis, Action 3 of the OECD/G20 
BEPS initiative provides a specific option for IP provisions. 
In this way, the IP income earned by a CFC that satisfied 
the requirements of the “nexus approach” would not be 
included in CFC income. In Figure 2, IP Holding Co. is a 
controlled party, i.e. controlled by 100%, whose income is 
attributed to Parent Co., as it does not develop any sub-
stantial activity. On the other hand, Company B should 
also be treated as a controlled entity, as Parent Co. has a 
more than 50% control. Consequently, once the require-
ments to be a CFC are satisfied, the next step is to decide 
whether the income earned by the CFC should be attrib-
uted to controlling parties.
Consequently, if the taxpayer can demonstrate that income 
would qualify for benefits under a nexus-compliant IP 
regime in the CFC jurisdiction, such IP income should 
not be attributed or subject to the CFC rules. For instance, 
in Figure 2, the IP income of Co. B is based on the direct 
use of IP that has been acquired and on the IP licence in 
respect of IP that has also been acquired. In the latter case, 
there is no substantial economic activity, i.e. it is “passive 
income”; therefore, the royalties should not be eligible 
for a compliant IP regime and should be treated as CFC 
income. On the other hand, the level of the further devel-
opment of the IP that has been acquired for the direct use 
and exploitation must be taken into account, whether or 
not Company B has itself incurred qualifying expenditure.
To conclude, CFC rules should never apply to patent boxes 
that are in line with the “nexus approach”. Compliant IP 
boxes imply that they only grant a special tax treatment 
to IP income generated by genuine activities. As a result, 
the risk of profit shifting is removed. On the other hand, 
it is important to note that the “nexus approach” is com-
pulsory, while Action 3 of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative 
regarding CFC rules only contains recommendations for 
strengthening such mechanisms.
Figure 2: IP structures
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3.3.  Coexistence between the CFC rules and the patent 
box regime in Spain
In order to be in line with the recommendations of the 
OECD, the tax reform implemented in Spain in Novem-
ber 2014 amended the CFC regime as governed by article 
100 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Sociedades (Corporate 
Income Tax Law, LIS).60 In this respect, the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the LIS expressly states that:
it is necessary that the increase in effective measures in the fight 
against tax fraud is instituted not only at the domestic level but 
also within the international framework. In the latter case, the 
OECD work on BEPS is an essential analysis tool in countering 
the international tax fraud. Within this scope, the tax reform is a 
pioneer in introducing measures addressed at such an objective, 
i.e. the treatment of hybrids and the amendments relating to the 
CFC legislation. (Author’ s unofficial translation)
In general, the Spanish CFC regime permits the passive 
income derived from non-residents entities with direct 
or indirect holdings in Spain to be incorporated into the 
tax base of Spanish taxpayers. Following the reform of the 
LIS at the end of 2014, such attributions of CFC income 
have increased. As a general rule, a taxpayer should include 
the total amount of relevant CFC income in the tax base, 
unless the entity in question has at its disposal the em-
ployees and facilities necessary for earning the income. As 
a result, the CFC regime does not apply when the taxpayer 
can demonstrate that: (1) the activities and transactions are 
carried out with the employees and facilities of the non-
resident entity; or (2) there is a valid economic reason for 
the creation of and the business of such an entity. Conse-
quently, in accordance with Action 3 of the OECD/G20 
BEPS initiative, not all CFC income should be attributed 
under CFC rules, i.e. income that arises from economic 
and value-creating activities should be excluded.
Article 100.16 of the LIS states that the Spanish CFC does 
not apply if the non-resident entity is established in a 
Member State of the European Union, provided that the 
taxpayer can demonstrate there is a valid economic reason 
for the creation, and the business, of the entity and that 
there is a real economic activity. In addition, the CFC rules 
do not apply to “undertakings for the collective investment 
in transferable securities” (UCITS) that are covered by Dir-
ective (2009/65),61 as amended by Directive (2014/91).62 
60. ES: Ley del Impuesto sobre Sociedades (Corporate Income Tax Law, LIS).
61. Council Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective invest-
ment in transferable securities (UCITS) Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 
302 (2009), EU Law IBFD.
62. Council Directive 2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordina-
tion of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to under-
takings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as 
In such circumstances, substantial or economic require-
ments are not expressly required.
On the other hand, the General State Budget for 2016 (Law 
48 of 29 October 2015) amended the patent box regime 
to be in line with the various agreements and measures 
adopted by the European Union and the OECD. In this 
way, income generated by IP benefits from a reduction, as 
stated in article 23 of the LIS,63 in the tax base that is cal-
culated by applying the percentage derived from the fol-
lowing formula:
Along the same line as Action 5 of the OECD/G20 BEPS 
initiative,64 in calculating qualifying expenditure, taxpay-
ers may apply to a 30% “up-lift” to expenditure that is in-
cluded in qualifying expenditure (see Table).
As a result, the Spanish formula is intended to benefit 
taxpayers that themselves undertake R&D (&I) activities, 
i.e. Example 1 in the Table, but does not penalize taxpay-
ers excessively for acquiring IP or outsourcing R&D (&I) 
activities to related parties. This is probably because such 
taxpayers may themselves still be responsible for much of 
the value-creation activity. For instance, in Figure 2 (see 
section 3.2.), Parent Co. has outsourced R&D (&I) activi-
ties to the R&D (&I) Centre located in Country C, but 
Parent Co. holds 100% of the shares, so it may have made 
a relevant contribution to the creation of the IP asset. 
Consequently, if Parent Co. were to directly license the IP 
assets, it would not be penalized. Obviously, the tax benefit 
would not have been as generous had the company itself 
undertaken the R&D (&I), i.e. Example 2.
The amendments introduced by the General State Budget 
for 2016 are effective as of July 2016. The relevant law also 
includes a grandfathering clause. Consequently, the exist-
ing Spanish regime can be applied up to June 2021.
In addition, the application of the patent box regime 
depends on the existence of certain conditions set out 
in article 23 of the LIS. Briefly, these are that: (1) the IP 
recipient must use the assets or IP rights transferred or 
licensed for the development of an economic activity; (2) 
regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions, Text 
with EEA relevance, OJ L257 (2014).
63. The Spanish patent box regime was introduced in 2007, with effect from 
Jan. 2008). In Sep. 2013, ES: Encourage Entrepreneurs Law 14/2013 
amended the design of the regime.







Ratio Tax reduction 
(%)
IP income Incentive base
Example 1 100 (130) 150 0.87 52 500 250
Example 2  40 (52) 150 0.35 20.8 500 104
60% ×
Direct expenses related to IP creation, including the 
outsourcing expenses of non-related parties (increased 
by 30%)
Overall expenses related to IP creation, including 
outsourcing of related parties and acquired IP expenses
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the IP recipient must not be resident in a tax haven; (3) 
where the licence or assignment contract includes other 
services, i.e. technical services, it must be to differentiate 
between these and the primary transmission; and (4) there 
must be accounting records that allow the differentiation 
of income and expenses from asset transmissions or the 
exploitation of the IP rights.
With regard to the interaction between the CFC rules and 
the patent box regime in Spain,65 the new CFC regime 
has been extended to cover the benefits generated by the 
exploitation of IP.66 Consequently, IP income generated by 
a Spanish subsidiary, i.e. the controlled party, located in a 
low-tax jurisdiction is taxed in Spain. According to this 
scenario, the IP income generated by a company located 
in Spain benefits from the patent box regime if it fulfils 
the requirements set out in article 23 of the LIS, but the 
IP income generated by a Spanish company under a pref-
erential tax treatment abroad is penalized as it is included 
in the CFC regime. This is intended to attract R&D (&I) 
centres to Spain.67
However, it should be noted that with regard to these con-
siderations, when CFC income arises from economic and 
value-creating activities, it should not be attributed under 
the CFC rules. As Action 3 of the OECD/G20 BEPS ini-
tiative states, in respect of IP income, compliance with a 
nexus-compliant IP regime should be taken into account. 
As a result, if a Spanish company has a controlled party in 
a jurisdiction granting a nexus-compliant IP regime, the 
IP income derived from the CFC should not be attributed 
under the Spanish CFC regime, unless the income does not 
qualify for the regime.
4.  Tax Treatment of R&D (&I) Costs for the 
Purpose of the New CCCTB Proposal
Europe’ s current priorities are to restore growth and 
promote investment and job creation within a fairer and 
deeper Single Market. Corporate taxation is an essen-
tial element of a fair and efficient tax system, as it repre-
sents essential revenue for the Member States and is a rel-
evant factor in influencing company business decisions, 
for example, as noted in section 3.2. (see Figure 2), with 
regard to R&D (&I) activities. Many Member States grant 
tax incentives to encourage spending on R&D (&I).68 For 
instance, it is interesting to consider the North West and 
Scandinavian areas, as the Netherlands and Finland and 
Sweden are the Member States with the highest number 
of patents per habitant.69
65. The CFC rules can be regarded as a disincentive for the investment or the 
undertaking of certain projects or activities. See A. Zalasinski, General 
Report – Tax Aspects of Research and Development within the European 
Union, in Nykiel & Zalasinski eds., supra n. 14, at 61.
66. Art. 100.3.d LIS.
67. F. Serrano Antón, La influencia del Plan de Acción BEPS en la tributación 
española: impacto en la normativa, incremento de la litigiosidad y el papel 
de los tribunals, Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación 391, p. 104 (2015).
68. The generosity of R&D (&I) tax incentives is rising, particularly, in the 
European Union. See Danon, supra n. 3, at sec. 1.
69. According to Eurostat 2010, the Netherlands is third behind Finland and 
Sweden.
On 17 June 2015, the Commission published an Action 
Plan for a fairer and efficient corporate tax system and 
proposed five key areas for action.70 The relaunch of the 
CCCTB is at the heart of the Action Plan, or the “EURO 
BEPS Plan”. The new CCCTB proposal is intended to be 
a mandatory system to better enable it to counter aggres-
sive tax planning. In this vein, the Commission has indi-
cated its intention to consult the public with the purpose of 
determining possible options for attaining the objectives 
of the new CCCTB proposal. The consultation seeks to 
gather views, in particular, on which types of rules would 
best encourage R&D (&I) activities.
In the currently pending CCCTB project, the Commis-
sion has proposed a favourable treatment of R&D (&I) 
costs by making such costs fully deductible in the tax year 
in which they are incurred, with the exception of costs 
relating to immovable property. On the other hand, the 
Commission notes a more favourable option regarding the 
promotion of R&D (&I), which would consist of the intro-
duction of more generous provisions for deducting costs, 
such as super deductions that are currently applied by a 
number of Member States, for example, the Netherlands.71
With regard to the first proposal, i.e. the full deduction 
of R&D (&I) costs in the tax year that they are incurred, 
it should be noted that R&D (&I) related expenses can 
generally be deducted.72 Consequently, in the author’ s 
opinion, this proposal is not groundbreaking, as it is 
already present in a large number of EU Member States73 
and as it does not confer an additional tax advantage for 
taxpayers undertaking R&D (&I) activities.74 Therefore, 
the intention behind the Commission’ s proposal is prob-
ably harmonization.
The Commission has also proposed the introduction 
of more favourable tax measures, such as super deduc-
tions. Traditionally, tax incentives can be classified into 
two groups. The first category includes “input incentives”, 
which are designed to encourage investment in R&D (&I). 
These incentives are typically referred to as tax credits, 
enhanced allowances, or super deductions, and acceler-
ated depreciation. On the other hand, there are “output 
incentives”, which are commonly referred to as IP or patent 
boxes, which grant tax privileges to income arising from 
R&D (&I) activities.
70. Supra n. 15.
71. European Commission, Public Consultation on the Re-launch of the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), available from 
8 Oct. 2015 to 8 Jan. 2016 at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
common/consultations/tax/relaunch_ccctb_en.htm.
72. For the deductibility at the Spanish level, see A. Navarro Faure, Los gastos 
deducibles derivados de la propiedad intelectual e industrial, Crónica Tribu-
taria: Boletín de Actualidad 6 (2012) and El régimen jurídico-tributario de 
la propiedad industrial en España, Revista Técnica Tributaria 58 (2002).
73. See, inter alia, Mitterlehner & Mitterlehner, supra n. 33, at sec. 1.3.2.; 
D. Dalsgaard & N. Winther-Sørensen, Denmark, IFA, supra n. 3, at sec. 
1.3.6.; K. Künnapas, Estonia, IFA, supra n. 3, at sec. 1.3.6.; and A. Rajamäki, 
Finland, IFA, supra n. 3, at sec. 1.1.
74. Generally, expenditure for accounting purposes, i.e. expenditure that is in-
cluded in the profit and loss account, is normally deducted in the tax year 
in which it is incurred. Consequently, tax deductibility not only covers 
R&D (&I) costs, but also other kinds of expenditure incurred by taxpayers 
in undertaking their businesses, subject to certain conditions depending 
on each Member State.
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With the purpose of making entities more innovative and 
productive, input incentives may be targeted at different 
R&D (&I) expenditure subcategories. For instance, in Aus-
tralia, expenditure on buildings, certain assets and inter-
est cannot be notionally deducted.75 In this context, the 
Australian Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) (1997) 
does not grant deductions for R&D (&I) expenditure in 
relation to expenditure in acquiring technology wholly or 
partly for the purposes of one or more R&D (&I) activi-
ties if an aim of the R&D (&I) activity was, or is, to obtain 
new knowledge based on that technology or to create new 
or improved materials, products, devices, processes, tech-
niques or services to be based on that technology.76
Such expenditure can relate to R&D (&I) costs in the 
strict sense, i.e. machinery, equipment or buildings. This 
is the case in Belgium and Israel. In contrast, Austria and 
the Netherlands extend the incentive to cover overhead 
costs. However, Spain, for example, only includes costs 
on machinery and equipment.77 Nevertheless, buildings 
related to R&D (&I) activities could benefit from acceler-
ated depreciation by way of a maximum coefficient of up 
to 10%.78 Some countries restrict the qualifying expendi-
ture to R&D (&I) costs that are undertaken domestically.79 
In Australia, from 1 July 2011, the previous R&D (&I) con-
cession was superseded by a new R&D (&I) tax incentive 
available for eligible R&D (&I) activities that must be un-
dertaken in Australia.80 Nevertheless, such a condition is 
often more flexible among Member States. For instance, 
the Spanish LIS establishes that R&D (&I) activities must 
be developed in Spain or another Member State of the 
European Union or the European Economic Area (EEA).81
Some schemes also consider R&D (&I) wages to be eli-
gible costs, including, for example, payroll withholding 
taxes. For instance, in Belgium, there is an 80% exemp-
tion in respect of professional withholding taxes on wages 
paid to specific personnel with a PhD or a master’ s degree 
in the scientific or engineering domain employed in an 
R&D (&I) programme, i.e. the exoneration du précompte 
professionel.82 In the Netherlands, a 35% wage tax reduc-
tion is granted to employers in respect of salaries paid to 
75. The superseded AU: Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) (1936) sec. 
73B(1), Div, 3, Pt. III, Vol. 1 defined R&D (&I) expenditure as “expen-
diture incurred by the company during the year of income, being: (a) 
contracted expenditure of the company; (b) salary expenditure of the 
company, being expenditure incurred on or after 1 July 1985; or, (c) other 
expenditure incurred on or after 1 July 1985 directly in respect of research 
and development activities carried on by or on behalf of the company on 
or after 1 July 1985 …”.
76. AU: Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) (1997), secs. 355-225, Subdiv. 
355-B, Div. 355, Pts. 3-45, Ch. 3, Vol. 7.
77. European Commission, supra n. 9, at 57, “Table 5.3 – Detailed incentive 
base across countries”.
78. Art. 11.2.c LIS.
79. European Commission, supra n. 9, at 55.
80. Div. 355 ITAA (1997). See also T. Toryanik, Australia – Corporate Taxa-
tion sec. 1., Country Analyses IBFD (accessed 18 Aug. 2015).
81. Arts. 35.1.b and 35.2.b LIS.
82. Ernst & Young, Worldwide R&D incentives reference guide 2014-2015 
p. 25 (Mar. 2014), available at www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
EY-worldwide-randd-incentives-reference-guide/$FILE/EY-worldwide-
randd-incentives-reference-guide.pdf.
employees undertaking certain R&D (&I) activities that 
must be systematically organized in the country.83
In addition, input incentives can be related to IP expendi-
ture, such as the costs and expenses incurred in acquiring 
patents, investments in intangible assets or the purchase 
of new technologies. This is the case in Cyprus, where 
IP costs, as well as IP income, are covered by R&D (&I) 
incentives. In the Czech Republic, the scope of such expen-
diture is broader, as the R&D (&I) tax incentives are aimed 
at both R&D (&I) costs and IP expenditure.84
Finally, R&D (&I) cost can be divided into other less fre-
quently used subcategories, such as R&D (&I) services, 
consumables and outsourced services.85 In the United 
Kingdom, the incentive base relates to all these categories 
as well as R&D (&I) costs, i.e. machinery, equipment and 
buildings, and R&D (&I) wages.86 Consequently, the staff-
ing costs of directors or employees directly and actively 
engaged in relevant R&D (&I) can be qualifying expendi-
ture for the R&D (&I) tax relief.87 Expenditure on workers, 
e.g. consultants and agency workers, who are provided to 
the company by a staff provider may also qualify for the 
R&D (&I) tax relief, as it is the staff provider who contracts 
the individual whose services the staff provider then sup-
plies, but not through another person.88
In the United Kingdom, the following areas may also 
qualify for relief: (1) consumable or transformable mate-
rials used directly in undertaking R&D (&I);89 (2) the 
cost of relevant payments to the subjects, i.e. volunteers, 
in respect of clinical trials; (3) utilities such as power, water 
and fuel used directly in undertaking R&D (&I), but not, 
for example, telecommunications costs and data costs; and 
(4) computer software used directly in R&D (&I).
83. M. Schellekens, Netherlands – Corporate Taxation sec. 1., Country Surveys 
IBFD (accessed 20 Aug. 2014).
84. European Commission, supra n. 9, at 56, “Table 5.2 – Incentive bases used 
across countries”.
85. In the United Kingdom, costs incurred in connection with subcontracted 
R&D (&I) activities are qualifying expenditure, although there are dif-
ferent rules for small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) and large com-
panies. Under the SME scheme, 65% of the spending on certain R&D 
(&I) activities carried out for the company by a subcontractor may be 
reclaimed, but, if the subcontractor and the company are connected, or 
have jointly elected for connected parties treatment, special rules apply. 
Under the large company scheme, it is only possible to claim expenditure 
on activities that are undertaken directly on behalf of such a company by 
certain specific kinds of subcontractors (UK: Corporation Tax Act (CTA) 
(2009), secs. 1078, and 1133-1136).
86. European Commission, supra n. 9, at 57, “Table 5.3 – Detailed incentive 
base across countries”.
87. Secs. 1123 and 1124 CTA (2009).
88. Id., at secs. 1127-1132.
89. Id., at secs. 1125 and 1126, which reads: “Revenue expenditure incurred on 
consumable items employed directly in R&D on or after 1 April 2004 … 
The term ‘consumable items’ covers consumable or transformable items. 
This includes water, fuel and power of any kind. Software is not within 
consumable items as it is not consumed or transformed”. A good example 
of consumable item would be a laboratory chemical used in the R&D (&I) 
process, which is consumed in the R&D (&I) process or converted into 
unusable products. Another example could be electronic components 
that are integrated into a larger assembly in such a way that they are effec-
tively transformed into part of a larger prototype and are no longer avail-
able for use for other purposes. (See Her Majesty’ s Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) Corporate Intangibles Research and Development Manual 
(CIRD) 82400.)
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5.  Conclusions
There is no doubt as to the very significant 
economic and scientific value of R&D (&I) 
activities. Such activities are drivers for 
productivity, competitiveness and job creation. The 
encouragement of these activities can also contribute 
in the creation of a “knowledge culture” in society. 
According to Action 5 of the OECD/G20 BEPS 
initiative, IP-intensive industries are a key driver of 
growth and employment.90 Consequently, countries 
are free to provide tax incentives for R&D (&I) 
activities with the purpose of enhancing high-level 
technologies, innovative processes and the number 
of patents.91 As is commonly held, countries strongly 
encouraging scientific research and technological 
innovation were better suited to deal with the effects 
of the economic crisis and unemployment issues. 
There is also no doubt that R&D (&I) activities may 
give rise to abuse, market distortions and profit 
shifting due to their very mobile nature.
As noted in section 2.2.2., new provisions have 
been implemented to target base erosion and profit 
shifting concerns arising from patent box regimes, 
for example, the non-deduction on royalties as 
introduced by Austria in 2014. As the European 
Commission states, unilateral action by Member 
States would not adequately tackle the problem 
of aggressive tax planning and would create other 
problems, i.e. uncoordinated measures against 
profit shifting can do more harm than good.92 
Therefore, even if such measures may be effective 
in countering IP profit shifting, SAARs and other 
specific provisions may result in more litigation 
and greater uncertainty, in particular when taken 
unilaterally. As a result, “a principles or standards 
approach” is required.93 In this vein, the substance 
requirement may act as a standard in realigning the 
taxation of profits with the substantial activities that 
90. OECD, supra n. 6, at 24.
91. In reality, the OECD (supra n. 6) does not make recommendations on 
the introduction of IP regimes and jurisdictions remain free to decide 
whether to implement such regimes. Rather, the OECD (supra n. 6, at 24) 
describes the outer limits of an IP regime that grants benefits in respect 
of R&D (&I) activities, but does not have harmful effects on other coun-
tries.
92. COM (2016)23/2: Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council: Anti-Tax Avoidance Package: Next 
Steps towards delivering effective taxation and greater tax transparency 
in the EU, p. 3. 
93. Freedman, supra n. 30, at 352.
generate them. And indeed, “reinforcing substance 
requirements in the existing international standards” 
is one of the three key pillars of the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan.
In the context of IP regimes, the substantial activity 
requirement is based on the nexus approach. 
Consequently, IP income eligible for a nexus-
compliant IP regime can fully benefit from the 
incentive. This implies the non-consideration 
of abusive behaviour and the existence of valid 
economic reasons with regard to the transaction 
undertaken. On the other hand, CFC rules should 
never apply to IP income that arises from the CFC, 
but qualifies for a compliant patent box regime in the 
CFC jurisdiction.
It should also be noted that the Final Report on 
Action 3 of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative contains 
recommendations, and not minimum standards, that 
are designed:
to ensure that jurisdictions that choose to implement them 
will have rules that effectively prevent taxpayers from shifting 
income into foreign subsidiaries.94
This purpose is realized in respect of R&D (&I) and 
IP schemes where there are real and value-creating 
activities with regard to any income earned.
The proposals regarding Action 6 of the OECD/G20 
BEPS initiative affect tax treaties. IP income should 
therefore be subject to tax in the source state if the 
residence state has a patent box regime that meets the 
requirements set out in the relevant tax treaty.
In conclusion, a tax measure is proportional when it 
maintains a fair balance between its effectiveness in 
encouraging R&D (&I) activities and IP structures, 
on the one hand, and the effect on tax revenue, i.e. in 
protecting tax bases and avoiding profit shifting, on 
the other.
94. OECD, supra n. 5, at 11.
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